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Corporeal Substances and True Unities 
1. In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance
has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must 
be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting 
interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the 
interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad. 
Thus I will be supporting the by now traditional interpretation of Leibniz on these 
matters, that of Russell. He holds that for Leibniz corporeal substances are just souls, 
monads; call this the "Monadological view." Upholders of the tradition include Couterat, 
Cassirer, Janet, and Rescher. 1 Important recent commentators, following Broad, have 
questioned the tradition, and have found an Aristotelian strain in Leibniz's thought.2 
They hold that in at least some of his writings Leibniz defends a view that corporeal 
substances are composite unities -- composites of soul and matter while yet being true 
unities. And they hold that, at least in points of detail, this interpretation is inconsistent 
with the Monadological view. Thus they attribute to Leibniz what I will call the 
Composite Unity view. 3 
It is hard to state the difference between these two views. As interpretations both 
have to explicate Leibniz's claims that corporeal substances are both unities and 
composites, so little said on behalf of one interpretation cannot be re-said on behalf of 
the other. Thus many of the differences between the two are going to be subtle. 
Nonetheless there is a clear difference between them. The Monadological view is that 
each corporeal substance is just a soul. The Composite Unity view is that no corporeal 
substance is just a soul. 
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Opponents to the Russell tradition differ on whether Leibniz held both views or 
just the latter at the time of the Arnauld Correspondence, during the time which has 
come to be called Leibniz's middle period. All agree that in his late period Leibniz held 
solely the Monadological view. But what about during the middle period? 
Garber and Sleigh think he held both views and that they are inconsistent. Garber 
says they are two variations on a theme resulting from Leibniz's vacillating only on 
finer questions. 4 And Sleigh says Leibniz defends the Composite Unity view without in 
the last analysis holding it.5 Garber has Leibniz being simply inconsistent. Sleigh has 
Leibniz being disingenuous, or at least sometimes without warning trying to defend a 
position he doesn't hold. The traditional interpretation of Leibniz is not being 
overthrown by either, just qualified and refined. Other commentators reject the 
traditional interpretation outright. Robert Adams, Stuart Brown, and Catherine Wilson 
claim that in the Arnauld Correspondence Leibniz holds the Composite Unity view, not 
the Monadological view.6 
My contribution is meant to be three-fold: First,I want to explicate Leibniz's 
argument that given corporeal substances are real, there are substantial forms ( souls, 
monads). Call it the "true unities argument." It entails that only souls are real. 
Nothing else. Only the Monadological view can be a correct interpretation of Leibniz. 
Second, I want to account for the extraordinarily compelling evidence in favor of 
the Composite Unity view. The view has two sub-views as it turns out, so I consider 
evidence for each. What divides the view is Leibniz's use of the distinction between 
primary matter and secondary matter. Thus a corporeal substance is a composite of soul 
and primary matter on the one hand, and of soul and secondary matter on the other. 
For Leibniz a corporeal substance's secondary matter is an aggregate of other 
corporeal substances united by the soul of the first. These other substances are said to 
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be parts of the first. The Composite Unity view has it that many things (the aggregate) 
plus one thing (the soul) equals one thing (the corporeal substance). However, as I will 
show, Leibniz distinguishes various senses of 'part'. In the strict sense a corporeal 
substance has no parts. When he says they do he is using a more liberal sense of the 
term in which a dominant monad has subordinate monads as "parts." 
For Leibniz primary matter, in one sense, is an aspect of a single monad -- that 
monad's "primitive passive power." (LA.153, Gii 120) Call it "individual primary 
matter." It is indivisible. In another related sense primary matter is an aspect of a 
collection of monads -- their primitive passive powers taken collectively. I'll call this 
"collective primary matter." It is extended and divisible. In the case of a corporeal 
substance, the relevant collection is that corporeal substance plus its secondary matter. 
The substances in its secondary matter are not really parts of a corporeal substance, so 
the collective primary matter abstracted from them is not really a part either. 
Likewise the divisibility of this primary matter is no threat to the indivisibility of the 
monad. But what about the single monad's own primary matter? The Composite Unity 
view has it that there is a "genuine distinction between form or soul and primary 
matter," and/orthat there is a "real distinction between a form or soul with matter, and 
that same form or soul without." (Garber, p. 54) I will show that however genuine, 
neither is a real distinction in the Scholastic sense, i.e. not a numerical distinction 
between two real things.? 
Third I will suggest that the Aristotelian strain in Leibniz's thought can be 
disassociated from the Composite Unity view, and retained with the Monadological view. 
A corporeal substances properly so-called is a monad "composed" of entelechy and 
individual primary matter (i.e. these are aspects of it). Speaking more loosely, 
however, a corporeal substance is a whole "machine" -- dominant monad plus 
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subordinate secondary matter -- which is a well-founded phenomenon. That is to say it 
is falsely but usefully supposed a single real thing. And this supposed thing, like a 
monad, can be seen as being "composed" of entelechy and primary matter. The latter is 
also a well-founded phenomenon; it is falsely but usefully supposed real. Why useful? 
Laws which hold for inter-subjective observation and which allow prediction can be 
formulated on these suppositions. Fom these suppositions, an Aristotelian picture of 
reality results. 
view of Leibnizian corporeal substance is the natural result of taking seriously his 
claims that secondary matter has phenomenal unity and that primary matter has 
phenomenal reality. Phenomenal unity is roughly falsely supposed unity; phenomenal 
reality is roughly falsely supposed reality. when the phenomena are well-founded the 
suppositions are useful to make. these particular suppositions are useful for the 
physicist to make. The result is an Aristotelian view of corporeal substance. The 
Composite Unity view rightly calls our attention to the Aristotelian strain in Leibniz's 
thought, while neglecting its basis in false though useful supposition. 
2. Let me give more details concerning the two views, then a sketch of my 
interpretation: 
It had been maintained by Cartesians that the essence of body is extension. But, 
says Leibniz, if extension is the essence of body then the unity of body is inexplicable. 
For anything extended is divisible, in fact infinitely divisible. And as Arnauld says and 
Leibniz agrees " ... divisibility is contrary to true unity."8 (LA.110, Gii88) Leibniz's 
opinion is that substance requires true unity (LA.120, Gii96) So anything whose 
essence is extension is not a substance. So the Cartesian theory of bodies precludes their 
being substances. 
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Leibniz thinks that if bodies are to be substances then bodies must have substantial 
forms which in other words are souls. " ... the substance of a body, if bodies have one, 
must be indivisible; whether it is called soul or form does not concern me." (LA.88, 
Gii72) There are two ways to understand this talk of the substance ofa body. 
( 1 ) The Composite Unity view: The substance might be a part that unifies other 
parts. It might be for example, that five material parts plus one soul equal one 
corporeal substance. This is the view that Arnauld thinks Leibniz holds. 
This interpretation is tempting because corporeal substances are extended, so 
divisible, so have parts. So Leibniz must have been trying to reconcile being a true 
unity with having parts. This much is right, of course. But the nature of the 
reconciliation is what is at issue. 
As I will argue, Leibniz's view is motivated in part by the principle that anything 
with numerically distinct parts is many not one. The Composite Unity view holds that, 
when the corporeal substance is unified the parts are numerically distinct. By Leibniz's 
principle a corporeal substance is therefore many. If he were saying that a substantial 
form makes a true unity of a corporeal substance, then he would be committed to its 
being both many and not. This would be a blunder caused by forgetting his motivation in 
giving his solution.9 
Additionally, the Composite Unity view does not sufficiently cohere with what 
Leibniz says, particularly when he explains to Arnauld that it is a misconception. 
Leibniz's view is rather: 
(2) The Monadological view: 'The substance of x' means what x really is. What a 
corporeal substance really is, is a soul. This is the view I will defend. Prima fade this 
view is as problematic as the first, for two reasons: First, corporeal substances are 
really incorporeal. That sounds inconsistent. But actually this is one of Leibniz's main 
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points, namely that corporeality is phenomenal. That is, matter is a phenomenon; it is 
supposed real, but falsely. Second, Leibniz thinks that material substances have an 
infinity of material substances as parts. How can this be translated into talk of souls? 
The answer will be in terms of an infinite hierarchy of jurisdiction of one soul over 
many each of which has jurisdiction over many, etc. These answers are part of the 
traditional view. 
The main problem as I interpret it, and the solution on the traditional view, can 
best be understood by seeing Leibniz as distinguishing three senses of 'part'. First, 
there are "formally constitutive" parts. lo (AG.204) According to Leibniz a whole just 
is its formally constitutive parts. If they are many, "it" is many. Second, there are 
parts in the sense of dominated members of a hierarchy of souls. Third, there are parts 
that would result from arbitrary divisions of phenomena (which parts are, strictly 
speaking, only potential parts). The problem of the reality of corporeal substance, 
which forces Leibniz to posit souls or substantial forms, forces him to give these 
various senses to 'part'. Let me refer to the first using 'part', to the second using 
'dominated "part"', and to the third with 'phenomenal part'. 
In brief Leibniz's argument is: Start with the ordinary understanding of 'part' 
which is, Leibniz assumes, that parts are formally consititutive. Given that every 
material part of something material has material parts, any material thing is just 
several things. Only something immaterial can be a true unity. How then can there be 
corporeal substances? Each is something immaterial. In what sense then is it 
corporeal? It has matter in three senses. In one sense, it has matter by having 
dominated "parts". In another sense it has matter insofar as it is passive (primary 
matter). In a third sense it has matter by having the primary matter of the "parts'' it 
dominates (collective primary matter). This matter is a phenomenon which has parts in 
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the third sense: The phenomenal parts of the phenomenon are not souls and do not exist 
except insofar as they would result from arbitrary division of the whole. 
It is the confusion of parts in these three senses that leads one into the labyrinth of 
the continuum. 11 Distinguishing them leads one out. The problem arises when saying 
that a corporeal substance is a true unity, arbitrarily divisible, which is formally 
constituted by its parts. The solution is to say it is a true unity, whose phenomenal 
matter is arbitrarily divisible, that has dominated "parts" which formally constitute the 
hierarchy of parts it heads. 
Thus the differences between the Composite Unity view and the Monadological view 
come to this: Concerning secondary matter, the Composite Unity view holds that there is 
a substance which has substances as formally constitutive parts ( or else has a formally 
constitutive part which is not a substance, but which has substances as formally 
constitutive parts). The Monadological view denies this. Concerning primary matter the 
Composite Unity view holds that there is a substance with a non-substance as a formally 
constitutive part. The Monadological view denies this. 
These differences can be summed up by the difference concerning the following 
principle: 
If formally constitutive parts of a whole are distinct then the whole is many. 
The Composite Unity view denies this; the Monadological view endorses it. I will show 
that it is assumed in the problem motivating Leibniz's theory, and so cannot be rejected 
in the solution to that problem. 
That is the sketch; now for the details. For present purposes I will only give 
details of Leibniz's "true unities argument" that given corporeal substances are real, 
"'' there are substantial forms. I give details of the rest of my interpretation J0f a longer 
version of this paper. 
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I. 
3. The motivation for Leibniz's account of corporeal substance, I will argue, is his 
conviction that divisibility is inconsistent with reality. At LA.122, Gii97 he says reality 
requires unity: " ... I cannot conceive of any reality without true unity." At L.A.94, Gii76 
he says unity requires indivisibility: "Substantial unity requires a complete, 
indivisible and naturally indestructible entity .. ". So reality requires indivisibility. 
will explain his position by breaking it up into three entailments, then examine each: 
(i) being divisible entails having parts, (ii) having parts entails not being a unity, and 
(iii) not being a unity entails not being real. . 
First, being divisible entails having parts. Leibniz says, " ... for the continuum is 
not only infinitely divisible, but every part of matter is in fact divided into other 
parts ... " (LA.95, g77) (See also (LA.122, Gii98) In general he is supposing that 
something divisible is actually divided. Also in Primary Truths he says "There is no 
atom, indeed, there is no body so small that it is not actually subdivided." (AG.33) Also 
he speaks of" ... the actual division ad infinitum of the parts of matter." (LA.152, Giil 19) 
Leibniz even thought that the potentially separated parts are actually separated. (See 
Principles of Nature and Grace, sec. 3, AG.207) But this assumption is not necessary to 
the argument at hand. All that mattters is that the potentially separated parts are 
numerically distinct. It was a commonplace that separability was a sign of the real 
distinction, the distinction between one thing and a second thing.12 Thus the divisible has 
distinct parts. So being divisible entails having parts. 
Note that this is not true for ideal things. Ideal things can be infinitely divisible 
without having parts. As Leibniz says: 
In the ideal or continuous the whole is prior to the parts, as the Arithmetical 
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unit is prior to the fractions that divide it, which can be assigned arbitrarily, 
the parts being only potential; but in. the real the simple is prior to the groups, 
the parts are actual, are before the whole. (G 111,622 quoted in Adams, p. 223) 
Rather, 'being divisible entails having parts' is true "in the real" -- that is of real 
things and of groups of real things. Of course in the end, what makes it true of real things 
is that the antecedent is false of all of them; it will turn out that nothing real is 
divisible. Leibniz's talk of groups and wholes will turn out not to be talk of real things, 
except insofar as it is talk of their indivisible members or indivisible parts taken 
collectively. 
4. Next, having parts entails not being a unity. Consider two things, for example the 
diamond of the Grand Duke and that of the Great Mogul. (LA.94, Gii76; LA.121, Gii96) 
They are two things, a plurality, when at a distance. Bringing them together does not 
make a difference to the fact that they are two things. This is true even if they touch, 
even if they are physically joined (for example set is the same ring). (LA.94, Gii76) 
Likewise the distinct parts of a whole are many things whether or not they are joined 
together. Their being distinct makes them many. So the many parts compose a 
plurality, not a unity. (cf. also the discussion of the two triangles at LA.88, Gii72) 
This last move is problematic for us nowadays, especially if we are familiar with 
mereology or the calculus of individuals. These purport to be logics of the part-whole 
relation. Nowadays we think that the many parts each stand in a part-whole relation to 
the single whole numerically distinct from each of them. There are many parts, but 
what they compose is one thing.13 
There are, however, alternatives to this view. One alternative is that the whole 
just is the several parts. It is not an additional thing. Being part of the whole on this 
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alternative view is being one of the several.14 This is how Leibniz and Arnau Id are 
thinking of a whole of several parts. It is just the several parts. It is a plurality.1 s 
Being several things is confusingly called by Leibniz being "an entity through 
aggregation." (LA.120, Gii9 6) 
Now the entailment follows easily given that no unity is a plurality, which seems 
uncontroversial. Note that being a unity is being a single thing. It does not mean being a 
unified thing in the sense of several things connected together. Rather it is the contrary 
of being a plurality. Thus having parts entails being a plurality, which entails not being 
a unity, i.e. not being one thing. 
Another way to object to this entailment is to appeal to degrees of unity. Maybe 
something with parts is not a perfect unity. But it can be unified to some extent and so 
be a unity in a lesser sense, an imperfect unity, an inexact unity. Arnauld mentions this 
on pp. 110-11 and other places such as p. 134. He thinks we can legitimately call 
things one even if they are not perfect unities, e.g. are accidental aggregations, 
mechanical unities, unities whose parts contribute to a common purpose, or organic 
unities. None are perfect because all have parts. But some have more unity than others. 
And that is enough to say that they are one. This is especially true of plants and animals, 
but is true even of the sun and a piece of gold. 
Both Leibniz and Arnauld use 'true unity' interchangeably with 'perfect unity'. 
However for Leibniz this signifies that what is not a true unity is not really a unity at 
fill. "The unity of these entities exists only in our mind." (LA.121, Gii97) Degrees of 
unity are really only degrees of convenience in thinking of things as unities: 
To be sure, there is sometimes more, sometimes less basis for assuming many 
things to be forming a single thing, according to the degree of connexion between 
these things, but that is useful only for summarizing our thoughts and 
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representing phenomena. (LA.1 21, Gii9 6) 
Again at LA. 1 26 he says that the degree of unity is the degree of appropriateness of 
conceiving as a single thing, because of more or less relation between the components. So 
aggregates without true unity are for Leibniz unities only by assumption (LA.121, 
Gii96), or by the fabrication on our minds.16 (LA.94, Gii76) 
So if the parts are distinct, and the whole is just the several parts, then the whole 
is a plurality not a unity, even if for various purposes we suppose it a unity.17 So 
having parts entails not being a unity. 
5. Now consider, not being a unity entails not being real. The basis for this 
entailment is the principle that unity goes with existence. 
To be brief, I hold as axiomatic the identical proposition which varies only in 
emphasis: that what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either. It has 
always been thought the 'one' and 'entity' are interchangeable. (LA.121, Gii9 7) 
Right now the concern is not whether being a unity entails being real. The concern is 
only whether being real entails being a unity. Or precisely whether not being a unity 
entails not being real. 
Why would Leibniz think only unities are real? He says " ... there is no multiplicity 
without true units." (LA. 1 21 , Gii9 7) and: 
Entity is one thing, entities another; 18 but the plural presupposes the singular; 
and where there is no entity, still less will there be many entities. What 
clearer statement can be made? (LA.121, Gii97) 
There are two ways to interpret this. 
( 1 ) Pluralities exist but they are dependent on unities. 
However this interpretation is precluded by the following: 
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... the composite of the Grand-Duke's and the Grand-Mogul's diamonds can be 
called a pair of diamonds, but it is merely an entity of reason, and even if one of 
them is brought close to the other, it will be an entity of the imagination or 
perception, that is to say a phenomenon ... (LA.121, Gii9 6) 
The plurality is not real, it is a being of reason or imagination. Rather we should 
interpret his claims as: 
(2) A plurality is nothing but several unities. 
This is how the plural presupposes the singular. This accords with the view of wholes as 
just the several parts. His view is that a plurality is not one of the things that exists. 
Rather it is some of the things that exist. This seems innocuous. This is what he means 
when he says a plurality has as much reality as the unities that compose it. (LA. 1 22, 
Gii97) Why would this be support for the claim that only unities are real? Because 
when we think about a plurality we think about it as a single thing. We say ,i plurality, ,i 
pair of diamonds. Leibniz is denying the reality of pluralities thought of as single things. 
It is pluralities considered as unities that do not exist. They involve a fiction or false 
supposition, i.e. their unity. 
He is certainly not denying the reality of the several unities in the plurality. They 
are real. If one stops thinking of the plurality as an it, and starts thinking of "it" as a 
them, then one would be right to think they are real. But it is not. Pluralities taken as 
unities are what Leibniz thinks are unreal. They are beings of reason, imagination, or 
perception, because they involve the fiction of unity. 
It is a small point and one easily stated. That is why he says "What clearer 
statement can be made?" (LA.121, Gii97) But it is an extremely important point 
because we almost always overlook it when reasoning about pluralities. We cannot help 
but think of ,i plurality as a unity and reason about it. This is why Leibniz thinks 
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aggregates are phenomena. 
If this is true, though, why does Leibniz call a plurality of unities "substantial"? 
It is precisely because the plurality considered as many has just the reality of its many 
unities -- which is just to say, they are each real. For a plurality to be substantial, 
then, is for it just to be many substances. (cf. Des Bosses, AG.206; Masson, AG.227) 
So to summarize, not being a unity entails not being real. This, I contend, is the 
import of Leibniz's claim, " ... I cannot conceive of any reality without true unity." 
(LA. 122, Gii9 7) 
6. So being divisible entails having parts, which entails not being a unity, which 
entails not being real. This entailment is the basis of Leibniz's theory of corporeal 
substance. All that needs to be added is his assumption that corporeal substances are 
real. I take it that he simply makes this assumption all through, as for instance: 
In the first place , one would have to be sure that bodies are substances and not 
merely true phenomena like the rainbow. But once that is granted, I believe 
one can infer that bodily substance does not consist of extension or 
divisibility ... (LA.AC.88, Gii.72) 
So the argument is: 
( 1) Anything divisible is not real. 
(2) Corporeal substances are real. 
(3) So, corporeal substances are not divisible. 
This conclusion quickly leads Leibniz to the view that corporeal substances are 
substantial forms, souls, monads. The argument is: 
( 4) Anything material is divisible. 
( 5) So, corporeal substances are not material. 
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Understanding Leibniz at this point requires a temporary uncoupling of 'corporeal' and 
'material'. Think for now of 'corporeal' as having a special sense to be explained, and 
take 'material' literally. In any event, as he says in A New System of Nature: 
... in order to find these real entities I was forced to have recourse to a formal 
atom, since a material thing cannot be both material and, at the same time, 
perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity." (AG.139) 
To be real something must be indivisible and so not material. 
Leibniz then argues that these real entities are like souls: 
Substantial unity requires a complete, indivisible and naturally indestructible 
entity ... [i.e.] a soul or substantial form after the example of what one calls self. 
(LA.94, Gii76) 
Citing St. Augustine, Arnauld concurs in the conclusion that true unities must be 
immaterial: " ... unity should be indivisible and no body is indivisible."19 (LA.107, 
Gii86) 
are: 
Why soul, substantial form? Because the available alternatives are no good. They 
... mathematical points from which certain authors make up extension, or at 
Epicurus's and M. Cordemoy's atoms (which you, like me, dismiss), or else one 
must acknowledge that no reality can be found in bodies, or finally one must 
recognize certain substances in them that possess a true unity. (LA.120-21, 
Gii9 6) 
Consider these in turn: First, consider mathematical points. They have no extension so 
they are not material. Furthermore they cannot even compose something material, so 
extended. The sum of their measures is zero. (AG. 206) Second, consider material atoms 
that cannot be physically divided. These are not true unities because they still have 
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distinct parts. For example, the parts where two material atoms touch are distinct from 
others where they do not. (AG. 142) Third, it is assumed at the outset that bodies have 
some reality in them. So the remaining alternative -- souls -- is the chosen 
alternative. 
What is the advantage of souls over mathematical points? After all the spatial 
measure of a soul is presumably zero also, so extended things seemingly cannot be 
composed of souls either. However the advantage of souls is that they have perceptions 
which can compose extended things, assuming extended things, insofar as they are 
extended, are phenomenal. 
This is an assumption that Leibniz thinks must be made at least for all material 
extended things (if there can be others) . 
... I believe that where there are only entities through aggregation, there will 
not even be real entities; for every entity through aggregation presupposes 
entities endowed with a true unity, because it obtains its reality from nowhere 
but that of its constituents, so that it will have no reality at all if each 
constituent entity is still an entity through aggregation; or one must yet seek 
another basis to its reality, which in this way, if one must constantly go on 
searching, can never be found. (LA.120, Gii9 6) 
All material things are divisible. (AG.139) Since the parts of material things are 
material, material things are infinitely divisible. (LA.95, Gii77) Being infinitely 
divisible, for Leibniz, is having parts, all of which have parts, all of which have parts, 
etc. In other words it is having no partless parts. Therefore a material thing has no real 
parts. It is not real at all. 
( 6) The parts of material things are material. 
(7) So no material thing nor any part of a material thing is real. 
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Thus Leibniz will conclude that something material and so infinitely divisible is only a 
pure phenomenon. (LA.152, Giil 19) It exists only in the mind.ZO 
7. My interpretation might yet not convince. One might think rather that 
corporeal substances are divisible but unified by substantial forms. After all Leibniz 
talks about their parts. My claim is that a corporeal substance is a substantial form or 
soul. So a corporeal substance strictly has no parts. Thus I am going to be obliged to 
explain what Leibniz thinks parts are and also what he thinks matter is. 
The opposing interpretation, the Composite Unity view, takes very seriously from 
the start, the apparent fact that corporeal substance has parts. This interpretation holds 
that, for Leibniz, a corporeal substance is literally a composite. It is made up of many 
things. What saves a corporeal substance from unreality is its substantial form or soul. 
This substantial form confers the unity required for existence. So take several things --
the parts; add one more thing -- the substantial form; the result is one thing, and not 
several plus one. 
There is strong textual evidence for this view of corporeal substances as 
"composite unities." I want to examine that evidence shortly. But I think the view just 
cannot be right. Such composite unities would be divisible. Leibniz says that when an 
animal seems to be destroyed, its soul retreats to a tiny part.21 So the composite is 
divisible; the other parts are separable from that part. (LA. 125-26, Giil 00) Also he 
says parts come and go. Again they are separable, so the composite is divisible. 
(LA. 153, Giil 20) Whatever Leibniz's view is, it is motivated by the principle that 
anything divisible is not real. At LA. 122, Gii97 he says reality requires unity. At 
LA.94, Gii76 he says unity requires indivisibility. So reality requires indivisibility. So 
it would be a blunder for him to explain the reality of corporeal substance in a way that 
make them divisible. Given a good alternative, an interpretation that attributes a 
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blunder ought to be rejected. 
Let me reinforce this. The Composite Unity interpretation specifically denies that 
having parts entails not being a unity. So the interpretation denies that being divisible 
entails not being a unity. But this premiss is one that both interlocuters agree on. 
Arnau Id says "divisibility is contrary to true unity. (LA.110, Gii88) Leibniz says that 
" ... every substance has a genuine unity, in metaphysical rigour, and that it cannot be 
divided, engendered or corrupted ... " (LA.161, Giil 26) 
8. Furthermore Arnauld explicitly makes a criticism of Leibniz premissed on just 
this Composite Unity interpretation. And Leibniz explicitly rejects this premissed 
interpretation. Arnauld says: 
I do not see how your substantial forms can cope with this problem. For the 
attribute of the entity that is called one, considered as you consider it with 
metaphysical rigour, must be essential and intrinsic to what is called one 
entity. Therefore if a particle of matter is not one entity, but many entities, I 
do not conceive how a substantial form (which, as it is really distinct from it, 
can only confer on it an extrinsic denomination) is capable of causing it to cease 
to be many entities and to become one entity through an intrinsic denomination. 
(LA. 134, Giil O 7) 
This is a rare case in which Arnauld is more prolix and obscure, and Leibniz is clearer: 
As for this other problem that you raise, Sir, namely that the soul joined to 
matter does not make an entity that is truly one, since matter is not truly one 
in itself, and that the soul, in your view, gives it only an extrinsic 
denomination ... (LA.152, Giil 1 8) 
This is the objection: Several things are several, whether or not they stand in some 
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relation to something else. So nothing else can make them one by being added to them. 
This is an objection to Leibniz's view only if he holds the Composite Unity view. But it 
seems to me he answers by rejecting that view . 
... I answer that it is the animate substance to which this matter belongs which 
is truly an entity, and the matter considered as the mass in itself is only a pure 
phenomenon or a well-founded appearance, as also are space and time. (LA.152, 
Giil 18-19) 
By 'animate substance' here I take him to mean the soul. If he means the unified 
composite then he is begging the question -- assuming what is at issue. Arnauld has 
challenged him to explain the unity of the animate substance. 
9. But the Composite Unity theorist might object here and say that the animate 
substance is the unified composite and no question is being begged. For Arnau Id objects 
only that the aggregate of the several parts, excluding the soul, is not made one thing by 
the addition of the soul. Whereas Leibniz, by 'animate substance' means the aggregate of 
the parts ~ the soul. The inclusion of the soul makes the unity of the composite 
intrinsic to it. And that is how Leibniz answers the objection that the unity granted by 
the soul is only extrinsic.22 
But I reply that if the aggregate of the parts are several things, then the unified 
composite including the soul is several things. For it is what composes it. To rephrase 
what was argued above in section 4: If the parts are distinct then the whole is many. 
What makes the aggregate a plurality is that the parts are numerically distinct. 
Let me explain further: In the aggregate of parts plus the soul the parts are either 
numerically distinct or they are not. If they are distinct then the composite is many not 
one. If they are not distinct then the so-called composite is indeed one, but lacks parts. 
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Either way the Composite Unity view fails. 
This reply applies also I think to Sleigh's valiant attempt to save the coherence of 
the Composite Unity view, by distinguishing being divisible from being "deconstructible 
component-wise." The former is to be incompatible with true unity while the latter is 
compatible with it. Take a divisible aggregate of corporeal substances; add a substantial 
form; the result is an indivisible corporeal substance, with true unity, which is 
nonetheless deconstructible component-wise. But again the components are either 
numerically distinct or they are not. If they are distinct then the composite is many not 
one. If they are not distinct then the so-called composite is indeed one, but lacks 
components. So the fate of deconstructible component-wise composites is the same as 
divisible ones. They are not true unities and so not substances.23 Leibniz's own 
principle precludes an answer to Arnauld's objection. 
10. To resist this conclusion the Composite Unity theorist must deny the principle that 
if the parts are distinct then the whole is many. But denying it would make Leibniz's 
discussion of the two diamonds very perplexing. He says, " ... it will not be said that these 
twodiamondscomposeonesubstance." (LA.94, Gii76) Why not, ifwe deny the 
principle? If a unity can have distinct parts, then why not say the pair of diamonds is a 
unity -- one with two distinct parts? If we deny the principle, then there seems to be 
no reason to require a substantial form to provide unity. 
The Composite Unity theorist might reply that in the case of the pair of diamonds, 
the connection between the parts is insufficient for the whole to be a unity with distinct 
parts Thus the pair of diamonds is a mere aggregate -- a mere plurality. The only 
connection, the theorist might say, that can overcome this being a mere aggregate, is by 
being joined by a substantial form. Only in this case is there a unity with many parts. 
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The connection between the many that entails the existence of the unity which is the 
whole, is the connection provided by the substantial form. 
But this reply by the Composite Unity theorist is subject to an obvious extension of 
Arnauld's objection. If you add something (the substantial form) to a many (the 
aggregate), how does this make the larger many (aggregate plus form) into a unity? The 
general challenge remains: How does adding something to a many result in a unity? Why 
not just a larger many? 
The only answer is that it is a special and mysterious power of substantial forms to 
do this. This is a possible answer, though weak I think. But note that it is not the 
answer Leibniz gave. In fact interpreting the answer Leibniz does give to Arnauld, in the 
way the Composite Unity theorist needs to interpret it, makes the answer unresponsive 
to the obvious extension of Arnauld's objection. Arnauld asks, how can the substantial 
form unify the aggregate? Leibniz answers, it does not unify the aggregate, it unifies the 
aggregate plus itself. Arnauld (supposing he made explicit the obvious extension of his 
objection) asks, how does the form unify this larger aggregate? Nothing in Leibniz's 
text is an answer. We can supply the special and mysterious power answer on his 
behalf, but he does not give it. 
A better interpretation would make Leibniz's actual answer responsive. My 
interpretation does. Arnauld asks, how can the substantial form unify the aggregate? 
Leibniz answers, it doesn't. The substantial form is the unity I am speaking of (not the 
aggregate nor the aggregate plus the form). 
On the Complex Unity view, the substantial form becomes an ad hoc unifying device 
that provides an inexplicable exception to the above principle that what has distinct 
parts is many -- a principle that was part of the motivation for appealing to substantial 
forms. On the Monadological view the principle is exceptionless. Substantial forms are 
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appealed to precisely because they lack parts. Thus Leibniz says, "Only indivisible 
substances and their different states are absolutely real." (LA.153, Giil 19) 
11 . The Composite Unity theorist might respond that the Composite Unity is one thing 
and the several parts are several other things that stand in some relation to it, some 
relation in virtue of which they are called 'parts'. 
But given this response, the so-called "parts" are not parts in the strict sense 
Leibniz uses in arguing that the divisible is not real. In that argument Leibniz assumes 
the several parts are what the composite is, rather than several things the composite 
stands in some relation to. In other works, he assumes that parts are "formally 
constitutive." (AG. 204) God cannot even by a miracle remove formally constitutive 
parts and leave the whole intact. But the sort of "parts" the Composite Unity theorist's 
current response appeals to, would not be formally constitutive. Each is distinct from 
the whole so God could preserve the whole without them. Given this newly proposed 
account of "parts" the whole is a true unity, not really a composite of parts in the strict 
sense. So it is not divisible. Admitting this, the Composite Unity theorist has given up 
the distinctive feature of his view. He has gone over to a view like mine that the 
corporeal substance is really something indivisible, which is Leibniz's reason for saying 
it is really the substantial form or soul. 
So either the Composite Unity theorist has Leibniz begging the question against 
Arnauld, or giving an answer precluded by one of his motivating principles, or failing to 
give the needed "special power" answer, or else has Leibniz holding a view like the one I 
attribute to him. 
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7. What sort of distinction it is is an interesting and important 
question, but beyond the scope of this paper. 
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8. Quotations from the correspondence with Arnauld are from H.T. Mason, ed. and trans., 
The Leibniz - Arnauld Correspondence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1967), hereafter LA with the page number. followed by a 'Gii' indicating the page number 
in volume II of Gerhardt's edition. 
9. If the parts are taken to be substances, then the Composite Unity view contradicts 
Leibniz's express statement in Discourse 9. "that one substance cannot be constructed 
from two." (AG.42) 
10. G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber 
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1 3. For a critique of this view see ... 
14. Note this is not the inclusion relation that predication is a species of, for Leibniz. 
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1 5. Glenn Hartz characterizes mereology as entailing that the whole is the parts. But 
by 'is' he must mean an identity-analogue such as composition. "Leibniz's 
Phenomenalisms," The Philosophical Review 101 (1992), pp. 511-49. 
1 6. Here I like the words chosen by George Montgomery in the Open Court translation: 
Aggregates without true unity are for Leibniz unities only by supposition (p. 190), or 
by fiction (p. 161 ). 
17. In section 14 I address Leibniz's apparent bald statement to the contrary at LA.153, 
Gil 20: "Thus parts can constitute a whole, whether it has a genuine unity or not." 
1 8. This may be confused as saying entities are some other one thing. That this is not 
the meaning can be gathered from the Montgomery translation: "Being is very different 
from beings ... " (p. 191) 
1 9. At this point however Arnauld is not willing to grant that only true unities are real. 
20. For a summary see "Primary Truths" at A.G. 34 
21 . This is to say the soul ceases to have authority over the rest of the parts. See 
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section 14. 
22. I think this is how Sleigh interprets Leibniz's answer. See Sleigh, p. 107. 
23. Sleigh himself admits that the distinction was a "slim point" (p. 125) which leads 
to a discussion "speculative in the extreme." He was just trying to do right by Leibniz. 
